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a b s t r a c t
This paper considers the implications for Supply Chain Management (SCM) from the development of the
Internet of Things (IoT) or Internet Connected Objects (ICO). We focus on opportunities and challenges
stemming from consumption data that comes from ICO, and on how this data can be mapped onto
strategic choices of product variety. We develop a simple analytical framework that illustrates the
underlying mechanisms of a product supplier/producer's choice between (i) producing multiple product
varieties as a way of meeting consumer demand (a “tailoring strategy”), and (ii) offering a ﬂexible and
standardised platform which enables consumers' needs to be met by incorporating personal ICO data
into various customisable applications (a “platform strategy”). Under a platform strategy, the ICO data is
independently produced by other providers and can be called on in both use and context of use. We
derive conditions under which each of the strategies may be proﬁtable for the provider through
maximising consumers’ value. Our ﬁndings are that the higher the demand for contextual variety, the
more proﬁtable the platform strategy becomes, relative to the tailoring strategy. Our study concludes by
considering the implications for SCM research and practice with an extension to postponement
taxonomies, including those where the customer, and not the supplier, is the completer of the product,
and we show that this yields higher proﬁts than the tailoring strategy.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
In Supply Chain Management (SCM), the trade-off between
efﬁciency and effectiveness at satisfying consumers' needs may
take place at different points in the production cycle and even
along the supply chain, providing opportunities for Mass Custo-
misation (MC). The objective of Mass Customisation (MC) is to
meet the needs of the customer for personalised products whilst
allowing the provider of goods or services to derive the beneﬁts of
mass production (McCarthy, 2004). In a review of MC research,
Da Silveira et al. (2001) state that MC can be deﬁned using two
different approaches: one is narrow and practical and the other is
broad and visionary. The practical view emphasises the role of
technology, process and structures in meeting speciﬁc customer
needs; while the visionary approach focuses on the use of MC to
reach mass markets when customers are treated individually.
Building upon the work of Da Silveira et al. (2001) and Fogliatto
et al. (2012) identify a number of research directions for future MC
research. These directions include but are not limited to: the
increasingly important role of Rapid Manufacturing (RM) in MC;
the dynamics of value implications to individual customers; the
design of quality systems that can deal with single items, and
issues associated with warranty on customised items.
In this paper we identify a broad visionary approach to MC
development that focuses on the role of customer value, and
provide some insights into how organisations can approach the
challenge of both scalability and customisation. We identify two
possible MC approaches – a tailoring strategy and a platform
strategy – and specify conditions under which each of them
beneﬁt providers of goods and/or services, placing a particular
emphasis on the importance of contextual variety of use and its
impact on customisation.
Since the customised manner in which customers' needs are
fulﬁlled is uncertain at the point of consumption, not only for the
providers but also for customers, one important aspect of a
successful MC strategy is to defer the customisation of a product,
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in its form or place, until the last possible point (Fetzinger and Lee,
1997). For example, Dulux is able to offer a vast range of paint
colours through in-store mixing of a relatively small number of
basic paint colours; whilst Jigsaw uses its vehicles in different
combinations to meet the different demands of consumer goods
and general haulage (e.g., Mason and Lalwani, 2008).
The key to MC is to postpone, as late as possible, the point
where the demand signal enters the supply chain, i.e., to postpone
the point at which work in progress gets turned into speciﬁc end
products (Forza et al., 2008). This leads to a resurgence of interest
in postponement as a ﬁeld of study. Postponement is therefore a
supply chain management strategy where the manufacturer pro-
duces a standardised and generic (and often scalable) product,
which can be modiﬁed at the later stages before it is ﬁnally
delivered to the customer, thereby achieving some degree of
customisation.
A number of typologies of postponement have been devel-
oped.1 In Fig. 1 below, the framework proposed by Yang and Burns
(2003), the focus is on the point of the process where the customer
order enters the system and identiﬁes a number of theoretically
potential designs. At one extreme there is pure speculation
(Shapiro, 1984) where all stages (design, purchasing, distribution,
etc.) are forecast through intermediate stages such as ‘make to
order’. In other words, the design and purchasing are speculative
but everything else is made according to customer order. On the
other extreme is Engineering to Order (ETO), where the product's
design, purchase, fabrication, etc. are all based on the customer
order. In a later paper, Yang et al. (2004) characterise these
extremes as pure standardisation through pure customisation,
with mass customisation occupying various intermediate positions
denoted by the dotted lines in Fig. 1.
Increased standardisation also helps the development and use
of mechanisation, design optimisation, and simpliﬁed quality
control, all of which result in high levels of capacity utilisation
and declining average costs (e.g., Lee and Billington, 1992; Baker et
al., 1986). Lee and Billington (1992) view the customer as an
external input to the postponement system which requires careful
redesign of products and processes to allow for simple postpone-
ment, such as labelling or bulk packing, or more complex post-
ponement such as localisation or assembly tests. Baker et al.
(1986) consider a stylised two-product, two-level inventory
model, with the consumer as an outsider to the system, to
calculate safety stock levels. Standardisation can also be cascaded
through the supply chain to achieve the characteristics of Fisher's
(1997) famous ‘functional product’ with, for example, a dampened
Forrester effect and reduced transaction costs between parties.
The decoupling point in the postponement literature reﬂects
the productivity-ﬂexibility trade-off. In their discussion of the
Customer Order Decoupling Point, Wikner and Rudberg (2001)
characterise this as separating decisions made under certainty
from those made under uncertainty. The positioning of the
Customer Order Decoupling Point (CODP) balances the needs of
the customer and the provider. The further the CODP is positioned
downstream (closer to the factory), the greater emphasis is placed
on productivity as more processes are subject to economies of
scale. The provider may also gain from risk-pooling of inventory,
reduced risk of inventory obsolescence, reductions in lot sizes for
upstream (closer to the customer) activities, for example, through
JIT (Just-in-Time) strategies (Forza et al., 2008). By placing the
CODP further upstream a provider can achieve greater ﬂexibility
and give customers a greater input, but this greater variety
impacts on efﬁciency as it may inﬂuence inventory management
through stock outs and reduced operational productivity (Wan et
al., 2012).
In much of the MC and postponement literature the product
experience or consumption by the customer is explicitly outside
the boundary of analysis. For example, Alford et al. (2000), in their
consideration of MC in the automotive industry, see the customer
as simply providing “needs” as a set of requirements (e.g., Alford et
al., 2000, Fig. 2 in p. 102), rather than understanding the con-
sumption activities that is antecedental to those needs. MacCarthy
et al. (2003) identiﬁes ﬁve fundamental modes for MC based on
the consideration of the “point at which customisation is under-
taken” (page 290), and emphasises the customer order as an input
to the customisation decision. Salvador and Forza (2004), in their
review of management issues of product conﬁgurators for MC,
consider a conﬁgurable product as one where the “company has
rationalised ex-ante what it is going to offer the customer” (page
275). In other words, the provider makes decisions about features
that are available for the customer to conﬁgure, and customer
chooses from the available set. Even those researchers who are
expanding the systems boundary focus attention upstream by
considering how postponement and different strategies around
postponement affect providers. For example, Sun et al. (2008)
consider the location of multiple decoupling points in the supplier
network driven by the customer order, whilst Gosling and Naim
(2009), in their analysis of issues of mass customisation in
engineer-to-order companies, consider the production ﬂow as
being driven by actual customer orders.
Focusing only on orders as the starting point of the customer
and not its antecedents implies that customer use/consumption
activities are outside the boundary of the provider's activities. This
has several drawbacks in considering an ideal MC strategy. It
conforms strongly to what Vargo and Lusch (2004, 2008) would
term ‘Goods-Dominant Logic’ (G-D logic), where the focus is on
the exchange between two parties, provider and customer. From
this perspective, customer consumption activities are outside the
boundary since the provider's value proposition, and therefore
what it is responsible for, is to ensure the product is satisfactorily
transferred over to the customer in the form that the provider has
promised, and the customer has accepted. For example, if the
customer wanted blue paint and paid for it, the provider's duty is
to ensure blue paint is given to the customer as efﬁciently as
possible. If the customer opens the tin, begins to use it and
subsequently realises that blue was not suitable, it would not be
the provider's failure, but that of the customer to specify her need
adequately. If the customer then returns the product as faulty then
this is typically dealt with through returns processes, a topic that
is usually considered under closed loop supply chain research.2
Yet, such customer failure is altogether very common. Indeed,
one might not even call this a ‘failure’. Since the product usage is
in context of its own environment of use, the speciﬁc contexts of
use may drive changes to the need and therefore the product
speciﬁcation that fulﬁlls the need. In specifying the blue paint, the
customer did not want to fail: there may have been insufﬁcient
information about the context beforehand and the customer took
the risk to purchase and when the information became available
later, the blue may just not be appropriate. This means that while
both the customer and the provider are uncertain about the
context of use at the point of purchase, the actual risk is borne
by the customer, since it is she who agrees and pays for the
product speciﬁed at that time.
An alternative conceptualisation of the customer within the
system boundary is offered by Service-Dominant Logic or S-D logic
1 See, for example, Lampel and Mintzberg (1996), Yang and Burns (2003), and
Forza et al., 2008.
2 For a detailed review of closed loop supply chain research see Guide and Van
Wassenhove (2009).
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(Vargo and Lusch, 2004, 2008). S-D logic places the customer
inside the system, proposing that value is co-created ‘in-use’ and
in the experience of the product by the customer rather than at
exchange. S-D logic considers value co-creation in use as part of
the provider's responsibility as well as that crucially, the customer
brings resources (knowledge, time, usage information, etc.) to bear
onto the system to realise that value. An S-D logic conceptualisa-
tion of a supply chain therefore includes the customer consump-
tion and experience within the remit of supply chain management
(Lusch et al., 2010). This would be a big challenge to providers, not
least because ﬁrst, the provider has no control or resources to
engage in consumption activities to ensure outcomes are achieved
satisfactorily (e.g., Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2004). Second, the
provider does not really beneﬁt economically from such a con-
ceptualisation under traditional business models of exchanging
product ownership since customer contexts and their varieties
occur after the exchange has transpired. The only two economic
reasons for an S-D logic conceptualisation in a traditional business
model of product exchange is therefore that of (1) achieving a
more stable demand proﬁle for the product, achieved from greater
intelligence from when customer consumption would trigger
speciﬁc customised needs or demand, and (2) to derive innovation
that would achieve greater demand or higher prices from mass-
customising the product. Even so, the heterogeneity present in
customer consumption contexts may make an S-D logic concep-
tualisation of a supply chain unviable. In this paper, we argue that
the era of the Internet-of-Things will change that dynamic.
Since the consumption space is not within the visibility of the
provider, an S-D logic conceptualisation of the customer would
mean that the provider suffers from uncertainty resulting from the
asymmetry in information, whether it is between the customer
and the provider, or between the purchase point and some future
time of use. Some business models that have moved the transac-
tion boundary from that of ownership transfer to outcomes, such
as Rolls-Royce's Power-by-the-Hour©, have beneﬁted from S-D
logic conceptualisation because they focus the provider in terms of
its capability development, i.e., achieving collaboration and redu-
cing uncertainty is part of the provider's capability to achieve
outcomes (Ng et al., 2012; Ng et al., 2013). Within the business-to-
business (B2B) space, where customers and providers are more
similar and symmetrically organised, an S-D logic conceptualisa-
tion to revisit the entire system of supply chain including value-
creating use activities to achieve collaborative outcomes is cer-
tainly more feasible. However, as the previous discussion has
made clear, the opacity of the consumer use and experiential
spaces of products in the business-to-customer (B2C) domain
poses a challenge to providers. We present this as three different
kinds of informational-related challenges that must be considered
and/or overcome. They are those caused by:
(1) Asymmetric information. Providers' supply chains may have
very little visibility of the customer use spaces beyond product
exchanges (i.e., providers have less information about usage
than do consumers);
(2) Complexity in aggregating and ordering available information.
Even under conditions of symmetric information about usage
between providers and consumers, the provider may not be
able to put the information in an order that makes it feasible to
engage in mass customisation;
(3) Incomplete information on the part of both consumers and
providers about future contextual usages. This kind of uncer-
tainty is known in economics as ambiguity (Knight, 1921;
Fig. 1. Postponement and supply chain framework, as presented in Yang and Burns (2003), p. 2077.
Fig. 2. Matching varieties with consumer characteristics.
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Ellsberg 1961) and if present, would imply that both providers
and consumers may resort to non-optimal heuristic choices
about future supply and demand for product variety.
Solutions to all three of these informational challenges would
be necessary for the achievement of the full capturing of surplus.
However, the literature offers very little insight into how this can
be done. This paper seeks to ﬁll this gap. Here, we argue that
problems stemming from informational asymmetries and com-
plexity (Points 1 and 2 above), can be solved through the Internet-
of-Things (IoT); but the resolution of ambiguity (Point 3 above),
would require a different supply chain strategy subsumed within
the IoT space. We compare G-D logic and S-D logic by considering
the supply chain strategy of tailoring (as one of the G-D logic
representations) versus platform strategy (as one of the S-D logic
representations). We also identify conditions under which G-D
logic and S-D logic may be optimal supply chain strategies for
providers. Our model shows that there are obvious advantages to
adopting S-D logic, while G-D logic may be optimal only under
very restrictive conditions. Our approach differs from the existing
approaches in management literature in several ways. First, to
date, the majority of mathematical models (e.g. Krishnan and
Gupta, 2001; Jiao et al., 2007) were developed for product plat-
forms (features and structural characteristics shared across a
family of products) rather than platform products (process and
feature developments over existing technology) as deﬁned by
Clark and Wheelwright (1993). In other words, existing research
extensively considers the conditions and aspects of tailoring
strategy for various types of industries and providers, yet it largely
ignores the question of how tailoring strategy compares to plat-
form strategy. Second, the model presented in this paper allows us
to construct a meaningful framework of provider-consumer co-
creation which can be tested empirically through an IoT market
platform demonstrator such as the HAT.3
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2
provides some background and intuition for our theoretical model.
Section 3 ﬁrst presents the static version of the model and then
identiﬁes ways in which this model can be adopted to allow for
dynamics. Finally, Section 4 concludes with the general discussion
of our main results and model implications.
2. Background: Internet-of-Things
The Internet of Things (IoT) is often considered to be part of the
Internet of the future, consisting of billions of intelligent commu-
nicating “things” or Internet Connected Objects (ICO) which will
have sensing, actuating, and often data-processing capabilities.
Each ICO could have one or more embedded sensors that will
capture potentially large amounts of data which can be analysed,
clustered and queried in ways that could increase efﬁciencies or
effectiveness (Perera et al., 2014).
The use of sensor data in the supply chain is not new. Many
organisations such as Unilever, United Biscuits, Motorola and Ford,
to name a few, already use Auto-ID data (such as RFID) within
supply chains (Angeles, 2005). However, the use of Auto-ID data is
often for location detection, and streaming of information through
the supply chain to enable a more efﬁcient ﬂow of materials. The
use of sensor data to understand consumption and hence custo-
misation of the product, is under-researched (e.g., Zahay et al.,
2009) and is the focus of this paper.
Sensor information from ICO could be used by providers to
improve customisation since the value-in-use of different varieties
of a product to a consumer depends on related customers'
characteristics. For example, point-of-sale system providers have
traditionally collected information about these characteristics and
consumers' preferences from purchasing data (we will refer to this
as the provider's ‘model’ of consumer's preferences, and for the
purpose of this discussion, will assume that this is common
knowledge). However, providers are typically unable to detect
the characteristics of individual consumers when they engage in
acts of consumption. Some online businesses have tried to
improve on this by collecting information on individual prefer-
ences through repeat buys, and use that information to provide
tailored suggestions of existing varieties of goods (Rowley, 2005).
However, the tailoring that can be achieved through these
schemes is limited because they use information that relates to a
very partial picture of the consumer's activities (the buying) and
only takes into account those consumption acts that ﬂow through
the same retailer.
Sensor-based information collected through ICO covers acts of
consumption and use that can include many products and activ-
ities in the household, and can therefore be used to obtain a much
more precise and complete picture of the consumer's character-
istics and hence of their preferences. Therefore in principle, the
detailed information available from the ICO data could make it
possible to produce speciﬁc products and services tailored to an
individual's characteristics and needs, as inferred by the ICO-based
transaction information, rather than simply making tailored sug-
gestions to the individual consumers about existing varieties. This
may become viable because the increased value of mass customi-
sation and tailoring to the provider might justify the ﬁxed costs. It
might also be facilitated by the reduction in ﬁxed costs of tailoring
afforded by technological advances such as 3D printing. By taking
such an approach based on G-D logic approach to the extreme,
providers could design and make a large number of product
varieties and customise them to each individual consumer on
the basis of the information collected through the IoT, i.e., there is
a speciﬁc version of a product being manufactured just for that
consumer. We consider this mass customisation strategy as a
tailoring strategy.
The pervasiveness of the IoT has a second consequence that is
of signiﬁcance to supply chains. In the past when objects were not
connected, our consumption and experiences of such objects were
reasonably independent of other objects and were only connected
through social practices. With the IoT, connecting up objects
creates an intervention in the usage of the product, e.g., we see
game consoles being used as communication devices, and set-top
boxes being used as computers. And as more objects become
connected, we may desire to see our heating system control our
water and electricity supply or our appliances. What this implies is
that single objects can exhibit ‘hyper-variety’ of use and greater
usage demand from the user. Furthermore, the extra variety that is
created at the point of usage could be observable through the ICO
data. This leads to the possibility of applying the ICO data for mass
customisation purposes.
To do that, a product or a product bundle must be able to take
on customer data as a customisation strategy. We call this a
platform strategy,where the product customisation by the provider
is postponed indeﬁnitely i.e. it is an incomplete product (Yoo et al.,
2010). This is where ICO data of the person can be applied to
complete the customisation of the product, e.g., using an indivi-
dual's nutrition data to tailor food products for the coming week to
meet increased ﬁbre content needs. Using an individual's usage
history may also help to determine when he needs speciﬁc
products. With smartphones for example, the customer buys a
standardised product and has to purchase digital applications that
he can use to customise the phone so that it could be called on in
context and on demand, allowing the phone to function as3 For more information, see http://hubofallthings.org.
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multiple products from dictionary and calculator to e-book and
torchlight.
One could even go further into personal data conversion into
material space. For instance, the customer could apply ICO data to
do 3D printing of a customised component, such as the 3D
printing of bride and groom ﬁgurines for a wedding cake. This
means that ICO data potentially empowers the customer with
‘completing resources’. ICO-based information on digital interfaces
may also be beneﬁcial to providers with a platform strategy, as it
would allow them to effectively select and recommend the
satellite products which best answer consumer needs. For exam-
ple, Apple has full control over the number and variety of
applications it offers consumers. ICO information may suggest a
more efﬁcient way of selecting these applications as well as a more
optimal way for improving customer satisfaction since context
varieties are better served. We consider such a platform strategy to
be a conceptualisation of S-D logic because applying personal
consumption ICO data is a structured form of co-creating use value
in context. Adopting a platform strategy means the provider
creates a standardised product as an incomplete product platform,
such that it can be completed by the customer. Unfortunately,
while this is possible for some, over-tailoring by providers to
improve customer service and increase market reputation may
result in a conﬂict between individuals looking to complete a
product through ICO data in context and on demand, and the
provider who has pre-set requirements.
A tailoring strategy suggests that decoupling is at the point of
exchange/purchase, which is the furthest point of a supply chain
for postponement. Platform strategy, however, suggests that post-
ponement is indeﬁnite, i.e., customisation is performed by the
consumer, in context and on demand, and we differentiate this by
calling it personalisation. Our paper models a provider's optimal
strategy (tailoring or offering a platform) based on a consumer's
private observable and unobservable characteristics as well as the
information exchange mechanism between the provider and the
consumer.
3. The model
3.1. Preamble
In this section, we present our model which operationalises the
provider-consumer experience based on product usage. As
explained in Section 1, this experience is associated with three
kinds of information-related challenges, all of which are captured
by the model presented below. First, we show how ICO systems
can solve (1) the issue of asymmetric information with regard to
product usage between provider and consumer, and (2) the
provider's problem of aggregating and ordering information accu-
mulated about consumer usage. Second, we provide both an
analytical as well as a dynamic mathematical model that not only
offers a solution to the issue of incomplete information about
future contextual product usage4, but also ﬁnds an optimal
customisation strategy for the provider.
In Section 3.2 we describe how providers may infer useful (and
not always easily observable) information about product usage by
obtaining and analysing observations of multi-level consumer
behaviour. In Section 3.3, we turn to the issue of how these
obtained observations (even under conditions of no information
asymmetries) can be structured and aggregated by the provider to
customise products in a meaningful way. Finally, Section 3.4
explains that even if problems of asymmetric information and
information aggregation and ordering are resolved, the provider-
consumer experience still suffers from incomplete information
because providers need to generate a reliable mechanism to
enable them to anticipate future product usage and thereby,
predict consumer demand for variety. Our model suggests such a
mechanism and makes speciﬁc recommendations for provider
strategy. We concentrate on the two types of strategies with
regard to enhancing customer value from product usage:
 Tailoring strategy (based on G-D logic) refers to a situation
when a provider opts to produce multiple varieties of tailored
products and offers them to consumers.
 Platform strategy (based on S-D logic) refers to a situation when
a provider creates a ﬂexible but standardised platform that
allows customers to purchase additional custom-made pro-
ducts which are developed by other providers but are compa-
tible with the platform.
Consider, for example, the current market for smartphones. In
this market, Nokia adopts a tailoring strategy by offering different
varieties of tailored smartphones, whereas Apple opts for the
platform strategy by offering a standard iPhone platform, which
customers can adapt to their individual needs by uploading and
using applications developed by other providers. In Section 3.4, we
analyse the beneﬁts of ICO information for providers which adopt
the tailoring and platform strategies under conditions of two-
sided (provider and consumer) incomplete information, and spe-
cify conditions when it is more efﬁcient for a provider to resort to
the tailoring strategy and when they should opt for the platform
strategy.
3.2. Dealing with issues of asymmetric information between
provider and consumers
In this subsection we concentrate on the factors at play when
providers use ICO to obtain consumer product usage information,
which may help them formulate a customisation strategy. We ﬁrst
consider an example to illustrate the idea of customisation that
takes into account the consumer's usage considerations with
regard to product variety. We begin by noting that individuals or
consumers who make decisions about products in terms of both
demand and usage, do so to try to enhance their own value. In
turn, this value depends on the varieties of products that they
consume, tAT ¼ t1;…; tnf g, and on their own (consumer) charac-
teristics, ζAα¼ α1;…;αmf g. The vector of characteristics is not
something that can be easily ‘seen’ by standard business models –
while it is true that some consumer characteristics are observable
and can be readily incorporated into standard business models
(such characteristics may include an individual's gender, age, etc.),
there are other characteristics that are not observable but are
rather personal and private. It is these characteristics that are
associated with informational problems since they cannot be
incorporated into business models unless there are the correct
incentives in place for the revelation and categorisation of ‘true’
characteristics (and this incentive problem could be quite severe
for some private characteristics such as sexual habits, mental
health status, and details of ‘not easy to observe’ product usage
inside and outside of the home).
To further illustrate the idea of characteristics, consider a
household that can have either one or two rooms, rA 1; 2f g, and
either one or two children, kA 1; 2f g. A provider might very well
have information about k but unless they also know r and take into
account all of the different possible combinations of rooms and
kids, k; rð Þ ¼ 1;1ð Þ; 1;2ð Þ; 2;1ð Þ; 2;2ð Þ , then they will be making
decisions based on asymmetric information (i.e, they will not have
access to all characteristics which may be known to consumers4 This solution cannot be offered by ICO.
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and which could, potentially, affect their product usage). We can
represent the primary characteristics (in our example, rooms and
children) and their combinations in a table (see Table 1):
Therefore, there exists information asymmetry between providers
and consumers as providers have access only to a minor subset of
consumer characteristics which (may) affect product usage.
Now consider a different example. Several varieties of the same
product (a smartphone, for example, can be ergonomic or basic,
with keyboard or touchscreen, black or pink, etc.) can each be
produced at some ﬁxed production cost (the 3D printer needs to
be adjusted for every variety). The varieties of smartphones can be
represented by the T set of possible varieties. Now assume that
there is some ‘model’ that maps consumer characteristics onto a
value for consumers and let it be denoted by VðT ;α;ωÞ, where ω is
some positive real valued parameter. To begin with, assume that
this ‘model’ is something that providers know about5, but other
than this, providers would also like to know exactly what the
model looks like for each and every consumer, i.e., they would like
to know each consumer's value functions. This would allow them
to match the product variety to characteristics in a way that
delivers the maximum value to consumers (which would then
allow the provider to charge a higher price and maximise proﬁt).
But this can only happen if the provider can observe α and the
mapping between T and α.
Using a simple example, suppose that a consumer's value
function is given by the following mapping:
VðT ; α;ωÞ ¼ωðtζÞ2 ð1Þ
where tAT and ζAα. This consumer places a value on the product
consumed that depends on how well the offered product variety
matches her ideal product variety (which in the example above
depends on a single characteristic, ζ). The ‘distance’ between the
offered product variety and the ideal product variety is given by
the term (tζ). To generalise this notion, we can suppose that
each consumer has characteristics ζA ½0; 1, that there is one
product that is consumed and there are tA ½0; 1 possible varieties
of it. The line depicted in Fig. 2 captures the ordering of varieties
and the preferences over varieties: an individual with ζ¼0 is best
matched with the variety t¼0. As t diverges from 0, that consumer
becomes less satisﬁed and places less value on t (which has
implications for the price that can be charged for t).6
Now the provider that makes smartphones needs to decide
about the variety that they want to produce. They can get a higher
price with an exact match to preferences but consumers will more
generally have a lot of unobservable characteristics. In our exam-
ple, the best thing the provider can do in the absence of informa-
tion about unobservable characteristics is to choose a variety of
smartphone that maximises the expected total value of product usage to
consumers. If there are two consumers (subscripted by 1 and 2) identical
in every way in their characteristics, then the expected total value to
consumers is E½V1 T ;α;ωð Þ; V2 T ;α;ωð Þ ¼ 2ω tEV1 ζ1
  2
tEV2 ζ2
  2, where ζ1; ζ2A ½0;1, and where EV1 ζ1  and
EV2 ζ2
 
represent the expected preferred variety of the product for
consumer 1 and consumer 2 respectively. In this case, the best variety
that the provider can offer is the one that maximises total expected
value net of the ﬁxed cost of production, that is, E TV½  ¼ E V1 T ;α;ωð Þ;½
V2 T ;α;ωð ÞF . This results in a best guess of variety which is equal to
t ¼ ð1=2Þ, the average variety. For this choice, if consumer 1 actually has
ζ¼0 and consumer 2 actually has ζ¼1, then the total value to the
provider of producing t¼(1/2) is equal to 2ω ð1=2Þ0 2
ð1=2Þ1 2F ¼ 2ωð1=2ÞF .
How can product tailoring add value for the provider? Con-
tinuing on with our example, now suppose that the provider has
information on α and not just its expected value. Then if products
can be customised to “match” the ideal variety of each consumer,
the business will make two varieties, one for each consumer. The
total value to the provider then is TV ¼ 2 ωFð Þ: If ω¼1 and
F ¼ ð1=2Þ then E TV½  ¼ ð5=4Þ and ¼(3/4), customisation can create
value for the provider (and for the consumer) through a better
match.7
Since ICO allow providers to represent consumer behaviour as a
complex system of multi-level observations, from which informa-
tion about individual usage given consumers’ private character-
istics can be inferred, the model presented above lays out the
foundation of how providers can use information obtained via ICO
to optimise customisation.
3.3. Solving aggregation and ordering problem of contextual variety:
how ICO observations can be translated into meaningful information
for the provider
In the previous subsection we have looked at a simple model of
customisation where variety was endogenously determined and
information asymmetry exists between provider and consumer.
Yet, even in the absence of information asymmetry, providers need
an algorithm to be able to efﬁciently accumulate, analyse and
aggregate information about usage in order to translate it into
meaningful input for product customisation. To show how ICO can
solve this problem, we ﬁrst need to consider the notion of
contextual variety and modify our model (presented in Section
3.2) to endogenise T and ω. Contextual variety is deﬁned as “the
degree of variability in the set of contexts within which the
individual faces in co-creating value” (Ng et al., 2012, p. 4). In
other words, using our example, the same feature of a smartphone
can be applied to multiple contexts. For example, the camera
device built into a smartphone can be applied to taking pictures or
videos but also to scanning “smart” mobile tags (two-dimensional
bar codes which allow the quick ﬁnding of URLs).
Although consumer characteristics, α, cannot be directly mea-
sured by ICO, ICO can measure actual patterns of product usage.
Suppose an individual may have a camera in her smartphone and
may use it (for simplicity's sake, we assume that the camera could
be used in only one context but it is easy to imagine multiple
contexts: taking pictures, making videos or scanning bar codes).8
Let kA 0; 1f g now stand for the number of cameras in the
smartphone and let rA 0; 1f g stand for the number of contexts in
which the camera is used by a particular consumer. As in the
Table 1
Example of consumer characteristics and their combinations.
(k) (r) (k, r)
1 1 (1, 1)
1 2 (1, 2)
2 1 (2, 1)
2 2 (2, 2)
5 For the moment we assume this to be deterministic, but in Section 3.3 we
discuss the implications of this for consumer value when it is stochastic.
6 We can think of the line as all the varieties of smartphones that can be
manufactured. For example, the least ergonomic is positioned at and the most
ergonomic positioned at t ¼ 1. A consumer with ζ¼ 0 likes the least ergonomic
smartphone and if the only thing on offer is a more ergonomic one, her value will
diminish relative to the value she would get with the least ergonomic phone, i.e., by
the square of the distance that she is from her ideal point. Therefore, consumers
place higher value on product types that exactly match their preferences.
7 Obviously, if ﬁxed costs are really high then ωmust be pretty large relative to
F to make it worthwhile, but for providers with positive but small ﬁxed costs,
it should always be worthwhile to produce more than one variety.
8 For example, in a two-person household, both members of the household can
have the same type of smartphone or different types of smartphones.
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previous example of characteristics, the different possible ways of
combining smartphone varieties are given by x k; rð Þ ¼
0;1ð Þ; 1;1ð Þ; 1;0ð Þ; 0;0ð Þ :
To be able to use the information collected in ICO for product
customisation, one has to have an idea about how ICO measure-
ments would be associated with personal characteristics of
Fig. 3. Simulated expected values E V T ; α; ρ : ωð Þ½  of the consumer.
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consumers and their contextual variety preferences. For that
purpose, volunteer ICO participants would supplement ICO infor-
mation with additional information on consumers' private char-
acteristics as well as individual preferences for a product's
contextual variety. Then the expected value of variety t to a
consumer of type ζ in a household where sensor measurements
x is captured by Eq. (2) below:
E V T ; α;ρ : ω
  ¼ω1
ρ
Z αþρ=2
αρ=2
ðxtÞ2dx; ð2Þ
where ρ measures variety or “variation in the consumption
context”. Consider the following examples of graphical represen-
tations of Eq. (2):
Fig. 3 shows that the higher the consumers' contextual variety
(captured by ρ), the more varieties of a product a provider needs
to produce and the higher its costs are going to be. Therefore, for
very high ρ, each provider should set ω0 to be very high to
compensate for the ω generated from Eq. (2).
Notice that apart from providing a mechanism of aggregating
consumer information from ICO and translating it into meaningful
input for customisation, Eq. (2) also allows us to make three
intermediate conclusions. First, Eq. (2) gives us an opportunity to
derive the provider's optimal strategy in a static setting and prescribe
either the tailoring strategy or platform strategy for this case. For a
given support of consumer characteristics with mean zero, and
comparing two products (e.g., iPhone and Nokia smartphones, where
providers adopt the platform strategy and tailoring strategy respec-
tively) such that ρ1oρ2 and that have common value EV ð1=2Þ;α;ρ
 
which presupposes different values ω1oω2 - the value of tailoring
varieties of product 1 to individual consumer types will be greater
than the corresponding value of product 2. Thus, all things being equal,
commodities that feature a broader consumption context (commod-
ities that are ‘platforms’) need less customisation. Furthermore, when
ω0 is very high, it would make more sense for the provider to
customise its product by adopting the platform strategy and outsource
customisation to other providers. In other words, the higher the
demand for contextual variety, the more proﬁtable the platform
strategy becomes relative to the tailoring strategy.
The optimal choice of variety offered to the consumers is then
the variety t0 (which can be reached via tailoring or via providing a
platform) that yields the maximum value of E½V T ;α;ρ  for the
observed x. As shown earlier, if the value of the customisation is
enough to justify the additional costs of producing an extra variety,
then tailoring the product will produce additional value to con-
sumers and/or the business (i.e., the Nokia strategy will be more
proﬁtable than the iPhone strategy). Alternatively, if the value of
customisation is not enough to justify the additional costs of
producing an extra variety, it is more proﬁtable for the provider
to offer a platform rather than to tailor a product.
Second, since the richness of sensor measurements x would be
more complete and useful to the provider if these measurements
contain information about consumer contextual variety prefer-
ences, it would be highly complex and impractical if any part of
this information does not belong to the consumer. For example, if
providers had to deal with a third party to obtain any part of
consumer measurements (related to product usage or other
characteristics), the information would become very costly to
obtain, as providers are unlikely to collect a complete multi-level
set of all available information for the same individual. Therefore,
the conditions of our model imply that a mechanism of informa-
tional exchange where consumers own their usage data and make
decisions about sharing their data with multiple providers (on a
proprietary basis or otherwise) seems more optimal than the
outsourcing of information-sharing decisions by consumers to a
third party.
Finally, an additional important component of the ICO software,
as implied by our model, is a feedback mechanism that allows
consumers to provide ex-post measurements of the value experi-
enced from customised products. This would allow for the updat-
ing of the initial mapping V, which would in turn provide for even
more precise tailoring in subsequent consumption rounds. In
Subsection 3.4 we look at the provider's optimal strategy choice
in a dynamic setting.
3.4. Tailoring versus platform strategy under incomplete
information: a dynamic model
The previous subsection shows how ICO sensor information x is
related to consumers' private characteristics/contextual variety
preferences ζ for a set of varieties of different products as well
as how a contextual variety can be captured in the model. In this
subsection we show how our general framework can be extended
to model the process of product customisation (via tailoring and/
or via offering a platform) using ICO.
Even though ICO mechanisms solve the problems of asym-
metric information between providers and consumers (as shown
in Section 3.2) as well as allow for the efﬁcient aggregation and
employment of consumer usage information to customise pro-
ducts (as shown in Section 3.3), ICO cannot solve the problem of
incomplete information between providers and consumers. This
problem arises from the fact that providers need to anticipate
future contextual usage of products in order to provide the
customisation desired by consumers. We provide an analytical
and dynamic mathematical model of customisation under situa-
tions of incomplete information, and derive conditions in which
tailoring should be a preferred strategy over the platform strategy
and vice versa. Consider the following extension of our initial
model presented in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Assume that there is one
provider in the market producing one type of product. This
provider has a choice of adopting the tailoring strategy or the
platform strategy (e.g., in the smartphones market, a provider may
be in favour of the tailoring strategy, like Nokia, or opt for the
platform strategy, like Apple).
Stage 1 Consider that in time period dA 1;…; d1; d;…;D ,
the ICO detects observable sensor information x about product
usage as well as other consumer characteristics which can be
translated into the consumer's desired consumption criteria
cAC ¼ c1;…; cNf g, speciﬁed in N dimensions for the product
developed by the provider.9 These criteria set targets for the
provider's potential development of new product variety based
on the new characteristics in period dþ1 for N different
dimensions of the product cd1, …, cdN .
10 The current product
variety of the provider in period d (product variety before
customisation, that is, before any change according to the
consumption criteria) has a set of characteristics which corre-
spond with the dimensions of consumers' usage interest sd1,…,
sdN . We assume that there exists at least one dimension iAN
where the current product variety's characteristic lies below
the consumption criteria: sdi ocdi (otherwise the consumer
would automatically buy the initial variety of the product and
no further customisation of this product would be necessary).
Such criteria arise due to a latent need created by the variety of
consumption contexts.
Stage 2 After receiving the information from the ICO and
translating it into a set of consumption criteria for a new
9 The criteria c is set to maximise the expected value of variety t as speciﬁed in
Eq. (2).
10 For our smartphone example, these dimensions can be the interface, speed
of information loading, personalisable features, etc.
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variety, the provider adopts changes/customisation qdi in each
dimension i¼ 1;…; Nf g. These changes can be made via tailor-
ing or via making new satellite products (e.g., smartphone
applications) available on a platform. Subject to a combination
of internal and external conditions and circumstances, the
provider may opt to do nothing to meet the consumer variety
criteria qdi ¼ 0; to commit a maximum effort to fulﬁl the
consumer variety criteria qdi ¼ 1; or to meet the criteria only
partially 0oqdi o1 (this may manifest itself in the development
of a new product which meets only a subset of consumer
variety criteria).11
These consumer variety criteria could be incorporated by the
provider using low consumer resource (with little input from
the consumer in product value co-creation) or high consumer
resource (with large consumer involvement in value co-crea-
tion). From conditions set out in Stages 1 and 2 we can expect
that when choosing between the tailoring and the platform
strategies, the provider faces a trade-off between consumer
product variety criteria (which we call product variety) and
consumer resource (the amount of consumer input in the
product co-creation which is available or desired by the
provider).
The trade-off matrix summarised in Fig. 4 represents our
analytical model for provider strategy choice.
For a particular product, a provider considers the relative
certainty about the contextual product variety versus the
consumer resource to which this provider has access. When
consumer resource is relatively low and contextual variety
relatively certain, this means that the provider can anticipate
contexts in which the product will be used quite well, and has
low access to consumer input or does not want to rely on it. In
this case, the provider will offer homogeneous products as
there is no need for customisation. When consumer input is
low but contextual variety is relatively uncertain, the provider
will try to customise the product by using the tailoring strategy.
When the provider is certain about contextual variety with
regard to its own product but has access to high consumer
resource or expects consumers to engage in product value co-
creation, such a provider will customise the product using the
platform strategy. When variety is uncertain and consumer
resource is high, it is obvious that customisation is required.
However, both the tailoring and platform strategies may be
optimal. In order to specify the conditions necessary for each of
the two strategies to be adopted by providers for this particular
part of our analytical model (see upper right corner on Fig. 4),
we need to introduce an additional criterion which allows
customers to distinguish between providers – provider's repu-
tation.
In addition to developing a new product variety after analysing
consumer's variety criteria, the provider also formulates a
signalling response λdi , which could be positive λ
d
i 40, negative
λdi o0 or neutral λ
d
i ¼0. For example, a provider may pre-
announce the release of a new feature of the product (positive
signalling response), announce no intention to release a parti-
cular new feature of the product (negative signalling response),
or send an irrelevant or no signal (neutral response). These
signals form the provider's reputation λ^
d
i . Each signal highlights
the provider's effort to incorporate consumer product varieties
into its production line which may have an impact on the
provider's proﬁt.12
In this case, if the provider adopts the tailoring strategy,
similarly to the platform strategy, consumer variety criteria
ciT will be based on the ICO sensor information x (by maximis-
ing expected value speciﬁed in Eq. (2)). However, while in the
tailoring strategy, the provider takes sensor information and
makes decisions about which new characteristics of the pro-
duct it wants to develop for consumers in a new product
variety, in the platform strategy, the provider gives consumers
a possibility to decide for themselves which satellite products
they want to obtain/buy. Therefore, the consumer product
variety criteria ciT for the tailoring strategy will be a lot noisier
than the consumer product variety criteria for the platform
strategy ciP . Since changes qdi depend on the consumer product
variety criteria, if the provider adopts the platform strategy, the
changes it will make to the product qdiP will fulﬁl the consumer
product variety criteria better compared to the changes it
would make if it adopts the tailoring strategy qdiT .
On the other hand, if the provider adopts the tailoring strategy, it
will send more positive signals to the consumers than if it opts for
the platform strategy. This will happen because the provider which
tailors a product is more likely to pre-announce new product
modiﬁcations to the consumers by sending positive signals λdi 40
on a regular basis. Whereas the provider with the platform strategy
will mostly send out neutral signals λdi ¼ 0 due to the fact that
other providers develop satellite products for the platform.13
Stage 3 In this stage, both the product change and the
signalling strategy are realised. The outcome is depicted in
Lemmas (1) and (2) below.
Lemma 1. In time period dþ1, the product's level of customisation
(change) according to the consumer product variety criteria on the
dimension (area) i (sdþ1i ) satisﬁes Eq. (3):
sdþ1i ¼ sdi þ ∑
N
i ¼ 1
∑
ja i
qdi Uβijþεi ð3Þ
The intuition for this is as follows. The product customisation
(change) depends on the initial characteristic of this variety of the
product according to that dimension (sdi ) the adopted customisa-
tion (changes) on all dimensions∑Ni ¼ 1q
d
i at time dweighted by the
‘cross-dimensional impact coefﬁcients’ βij with ia j and on a
random shock εi. The cross-dimensional impact coefﬁcients βij
capture the effect of an adopted customisation (change) on one
dimension on the state of development on the other dimension.14
The intuition for this is that a provider's decision about the way
the new customised variety of product should look may have an
impact on its packaging. For example, any changes in the smart-
phone size and dimensions lead to the development of new covers
which are capable of ﬁtting the new phone dimensions.
The customisation outcome product variety with new character-
istics (sdi ) is complemented by the signal, sent by the provider to
11 Note that our model allows for the changes to be negative qdi o0 in which
case for one reason or the other the provider’s product variety characteristic
deteriorates relative to consumers' variety criteria. This may happen, for example, if
the provider opts for cutting production costs by making their product less
environment-friendly. While such changes are possible in practice, in this paper
we restrict our attention to non-negative changes which are most relevant for the
customisation problem.
12 Note that our model can be extended to cases when providers may misuse
the signalling and pre-announce customised product varieties which are then not
actually produced (such as, e.g., vaporware). In this paper, we leave such cases aside
and restrict our attention to the product varieties which are developed.
13 Additionally, providers which opt for the platform strategy are likely to take
less responsibility with customisation compared to providers adopting the tailoring
strategy, since they rely on other providers to deliver features desired by
consumers. Therefore, providers using the platform strategy bear a higher reputa-
tional risk compared to providers with the tailoring strategy: if other (supporting)
providers offer low-quality additions to the main product/service, this may hurt the
reputation of the whole platform.
14 Note that when βij¼1 the cross-dimensional impact is non-existent and can
be ignored.
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the consumers (via advertisements, marketing campaigns, promo-
tions, etc.)
Lemma 2. The provider's reputation in the eyes of the consumers in
the period dþ1 (λ^dþ1i ) is given by Eq. (4):
λ^
dþ1
i ¼ λ^
d
i U ∑
N
i ¼ 1
∑
ja i
qdi Uδijþ ∑
N
j ¼ 1
∑
ja i
λtj Uγijþεi ð4Þ
The intuition for this is as follows. The provider's reputation in
period dþ1 is simply the reputation of the provider in the
previous period λ^
d
i adjusted for the recent customisation changes
∑Ni ¼ 1q
d
i and signalling efforts ∑
N
i ¼ 1λ
d
i through their impact coefﬁ-
cients δij and γij, and corrected for the random shock εi. The impact
coefﬁcients δij refer to the effect of an adopted customisation
(change) on one dimension of the provider's reputation according
to a different dimension. For example, consumers may believe that
the iPhone is of better quality because it offers more personali-
sable features compared with its competition. The impact coefﬁ-
cients γij describe the effect of the signalling effort according to
one dimension of the product on the provider's reputation
according to the other dimension.15
Stage 4 Finally, the consumer evaluates the provider's custo-
misation efforts based on the decision rule formulated in
Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1. The consumer evaluates the product's customisation
according to each dimension as a weighted sum of the actual
characteristic of this product after customisation (change) sdþ1i and
the formation of the new provider's reputation λ^
dþ1
l . If the product
change outruns the corresponding benchmark cdi derived from the ICO
measures of x, consumption criteria for the future product remain
unchanged cdþ1i ¼ cdi and in period dþ1 we are likely to observe no
change in consumption patterns.
However, if the provider fails to meet the consumption criteria,
this does not necessarily mean that consumers would stop buying
the product or would not buy a product which has an incomplete
set of desired characteristics. In this case, consumers will consider
lowering their desired consumer product variety criteria exactly to
the level of the current product variety's characteristics. The
revised consumer product variety criteria cdþ1i (and weighted by
their relative importance θi) are compared to a predetermined
minimum consumption standard (current consumption level x). If
these new criteria cdþ1i (derived through observing new x in
period dþ1 via the ICO mechanisms) are above the current
consumption standard, i.e. if ∑Ni ¼ 1c
dþ1
i UθiZx, the consumer will
buy the new customised product (obtained through either tailor-
ing or through the offering of new satellite product options via a
platform). This can happen when only a subset of the desired
consumer product variety criteria is fulﬁlled. Otherwise, when
∑Ni ¼ 1c
dþ1
i θiox the variety criteria remain unchanged and the
provider's product is not accepted by the consumer.
Let μA ½0;1 refer to the relative weight of the customisation
(changes) made to the product and the provider's image. We
assume that consumers weigh changes and reputation concur-
rently: in the extreme, they may place all the weight on changes or
on the reputation. The intuition behind this assumption is as
follows: When customers are faced with a product/service offered
as a platform, they have to rely on supporting providers to
personalise this product/service. Some customers might dislike
this as the quality of the personalisable features may be low,
which in turn may hurt the reputation of the platform provider,
hence making providers using a tailoring strategy more attractive
to consumers. Other consumers, however, would be willing to take
the risk of dealing with multiple providers and tolerate quality
heterogeneity to gain more functionality. These consumers will,
therefore, opt for providers with a platform strategy. Therefore
consumer product variety criteria for the future products xdþ1 )
cdþ1i minimises μUs
dþ1
i þð1μÞU λ^
dþ1
i c
t
i subject to the constraint
that ∑Ni ¼ 1c
dþ1
i UθiZx
Note that our model has several interesting features which
allow for the construction of a meaningful comparison between
the tailoring strategy and the platform strategy under conditions
where consumer product variety is uncertain and consumer
resource is high. First, it describes the dynamic process between
observing behaviour via ICO, translating it into consumption
criteria (desired product characteristics), making changes to the
product and then observing new purchasing patterns. Second, as
long as the level of product variety characteristics in period dþ1 is
not lower than the current consumption level inferred from ICO-
measured x, consumers may be willing to purchase products
which only partially fulﬁl their variety criteria.
Which strategy is more efﬁcient: should the provider resort to
tailoring or should it adopt the platform strategy? Given
Proposition 1, we can formulate the following 3 corollaries for
the case when consumer product variety is uncertain and con-
sumer resource is high.
Corollary 1. If the weight μ40:5, then consumers weigh the
changes made to the product (new product characteristics sdþ1i )
higher than they weigh the provider's reputation λ^
dþ1
i . In this case
(according to Stage 2 and Proposition 1), the provider with the
platform strategy will observe (through ICO mechanisms) new
consumption variety standard xdþ1 and infer new consumer char-
acteristics ζ which will exceed consumption variety standard of the
previous period xd: xdþ1  ζdþ1 ‘ ∑Ni ¼ 1cdþ1i θi4xd (consumers will
increase16 their variety criteria); whereas the provider with the
tailoring strategy will fail to exceed the previous period's consump-
tion standard: xdþ1  ζdþ1 ‘ ∑Ni ¼ 1cdþ1i Uθioxd (consumers will not
change their variety criteria). This implies that when μ40:5; a
provider with the platform strategy would be able to achieve a better
correspondence between consumer product variety criteria and the
new product variety characteristics compared tothe provider with a
tailoring strategy. Therefore, if μ40:5; the platform strategy is more
optimal than the tailoring strategy.
Corollary 2. If the weight μo0:5, then consumers weigh the
changes made to the product (new product variety characteristics
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Fig. 4. Analytical Model of variety versus consumer resource.
15 Note that coefﬁcients δij and γij can be ignored if they are equal to 1.
16 This increase can manifest itself as an increase in usage of the product,
increase of the number of contexts in which the product is used, addition of
another product user in the same household, etc.
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sdþ1i ) lower than they weigh the provider's reputation λ^
dþ1
i . Accord-
ing to Stage 2 and Proposition 1 of the model, the provider with the
tailoring strategy would be able to achieve a better reputation than
the provider with the platform strategy. The provider with the
tailoring strategy will, therefore, observe (through ICO mechanisms)
new consumption variety standard xdþ1 and infer new consumer
characteristics ζ which will exceed consumption standard of the
previous period xd: xdþ1  ζdþ1 ‘ ∑Ni ¼ 1cdþ1i Uθi4xd (consumers
will increase their variety criteria); whereas the provider with the
platform strategy will fail to exceed the previous period's consump-
tion variety standard: xdþ1  ζdþ1 ‘ ∑Ni ¼ 1cdþ1i Uθioxd (consumers
will not change their variety criteria). This implies that when μo0:5;
the provider with the platform strategy would be able to achieve a
better consumer value. Therefore, if μo0:5; the tailoring strategy is
more optimal than the platform strategy.
Corollary 3. If the weight μ¼0.5, then consumers weigh the changes
made to the product (new product characteristics sdþ1i ) in exactly the
same way as they weigh the provider's reputation λ^
dþ1
i . In this case,
the provider will be exactly indifferent between choosing any of the
two available strategies.
4. Discussion
This paper offers a model that allows both customers and
providers to infer consumer preferences for future product variety
from the day-to-day observation of consumption patterns in the
household through the IoT. Our approach shows how Internet
Connected Objects (ICO) can help providers use observed con-
sumer behaviour to infer unobservable consumer characteristics
as well as product usage patterns. We also show how providers
can employ data collected via ICO to translate it into meaningful
input to inform the development of new customised products.
Finally, we model a dynamic mechanism which allows providers
to anticipate future consumer product variety desires and efﬁ-
ciently fulﬁl these desires by choosing an appropriate customisa-
tion strategy (tailoring strategy or platform strategy). Our model
speciﬁes conditions under which the beneﬁts of tailoring strategy
and platform strategy become apparent, given different levels of
consumer product variety and consumer resource.
Our study does not make a judgement on who should own or
have access to such consumer resource, in terms of the ICO data
collected. Privacy champions would of course insist that since the
ICO data is collected within the private consumption space of
individuals, it should certainly be owned by them. Yet, this may be
simplistic as the data can only be collected through the technology
embedded within the products, and there must be a case for
manufacturers to incur the cost of embedding that technology in
the ﬁrst place. From our paper, we would propose a solution that is
market-based. Since value is created in context and context
exhibits variety that could be unknown and uncertain at the point
of purchase, it is optimal that the resource to match the variety is
best employed by the entity that has access to these uncertain and
unknown contexts, when they become known, so as to create
better value. Furthermore, personal data will not normally be
generated if consumers do not buy and place ICO in their homes
and attempts by providers to do so may encounter resistance. If
consumers have the main decision power about the use of their
data, they may be incentivised to collect more of it, and use it well.
The increase in demand for the technology may then render it
viable for the technology to be incorporated. It is left to future
research to explore this question in more detail both theoretically
and empirically.
The implications for Supply Chain Management (SCM) are
considerable. If the weight μ40:5, then consumers choose a
platform strategy. In this case, the provider is simply offering the
platform which consumers may personalise. Obviously, the devel-
opment and establishment of such a platform is deeply proble-
matic and subject to extensive network effects (Gawer, 2009).
However, once established, such product platforms have many
advantages including for example, component commonality
(Pasche et al., 2011). This in turn leads to considerable standardi-
sation in all the stages of the supply chain with improved demand
forecasting, lower inventory holdings and attendant reductions in
the Forrester effect and lower search and transaction costs.
Conversely, where μo0:5, t¼0 a tailoring strategy is more optimal
compared to a platform strategy. For the provider, such an option
is fraught with difﬁculties and challenges. For example, from the
ﬁrm's perspective there is strong evidence that higher product
variety results in failure to meet customer orders (Wan et al.,
2012), higher managerial complexity (Xia and Rajagopalan, 2009),
cost increases and reduced productivity (Stalk, 1988, Yeh and Chu,
1991), etc. From the customer's perspective, there is also evidence
that too much choice confuses the customer, leading for example
to post-purchase regret and resulting in the ‘product variety
paradox’ (Salvador and Forza, 2007). Solutions based on mass
customisation, postponement and product conﬁgurators (Trentin
et al., 2011) might mitigate these effects. However, the impact of
extensive increases in variety will be felt throughout the supply
chain in the Forrester effect and higher transaction costs. Finally,
as has recently been highlighted by Hazen et al. (2014), all of this is
predicated ﬁrmly on the quality of data associated with ICO and is
linked strongly to the emerging methods of data science, pre-
dictive analysis and “big data”.
The advent of IoTs has provided the opportunity to transform
the landscape. Postponement can now occur with the customer, in
effect adding a new stage to the supply chain framework of Yang
and Burns as shown in Fig. 1: the ﬁnal stage is not logistics
postponement but customer postponement. The movement to a
platform-based business model may also represent an opportunity
to change the provider's perspective from a relatively linear supply
chain to one of an eco-system where the platform provider acts as
the system architect and standard setter. Such platforms have
many downside risks, with increasing evidence of a single provi-
der becoming dominant and creating winner-takes-all markets
(Schilling, 2009). The associated transition of business model to
platform provider also suggests development of new organisation
capabilities, which evidence from other sectors suggest ﬁrms
struggle to achieve (Benedettini and Neely, 2010).
5. Conclusions
This paper considers two alternative provider strategies in a
world of ICO where far more consumption data and contextual
data become available for providers to complete products. The ﬁrst
is a tailoring strategy, based on G-D logic where a provider opts for
producing multiple varieties of tailored products and offers them
to consumers. The second is a platform strategy, based on S-D logic
where a provider creates a ﬂexible platform that allows customers
to purchase additional custom-made products developed by other
providers but compatible with the platform. Our model postulates
that the higher the demand for contextual variety, the more
proﬁtable the platform strategy becomes, relative to the tailoring
strategy.
The implications for SCM research and practice are profound.
We contend that the transition from product to platform requires a
movement in supply chain logic from linear to network, web or
eco-system. Providers need to put mechanisms in place to enable
customised solutions to emerge, and place their strategic focus on
the platform and the design of standardised interfaces. In the
platform world, those suppliers upstream of the provider may ﬁnd
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themselves in an increasingly commoditised environment as they
compete to provide standardised features to the customisable
platform. Other businesses will emerge in the eco-system to meet
customer demands that the new contextual data highlights.
In terms of ICO and the data it will produce, there are a number
of empirical studies currently being developed. One major
research project is the development of the HAT (Hub-of-All-
Things)17, the ﬁrst project of its kind to create a live multi-sided
market platform in the home, connecting consumers, Internet
companies and manufacturers to trade personal data for future
personalised products and services. Data from the HAT will help
this research team develop our theoretical model further by
endogenising the image-variety trade-off in consumer preferences
as well as introducing multiplicity of contexts in which a product
could be used. We will also test our model using the HAT
technology. While only empirical studies will be able to reach
conclusions about the relative optimality of the tailoring strategy
versus platform strategy, we anticipate, given consumers' desire
for hyper variety and multiplicity of contexts, that the real-world
consumers will behave according to our Corollary 1: they will
weigh changes made to the product characteristics higher than
they weigh the provider's image/reputation. Therefore, the plat-
form strategy would be a more optimal way for providers to
enhance value.
Research into platforms is at an early stage with many ques-
tions and issues. For example, empirical research is required to
address such issues as: how to create platforms where none have
previously existed; when is it better to have an open market, what
are the different platform strategies, what are the tipping points
and how do they emerge? The IoT has opened up a completely
new set of opportunities for research and practice in SCM.
References
Alford, D., Sackett, P., Nelder, G., 2000. Mass customisation—an automotive
perspective. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 65 (1), 99–110.
Angeles, R., 2005. RFID technologies: supply-chain applications and implementa-
tion issues. Inf. Syst. Manag. 22 (1), 51–65.
Baker, K.R., Magazine, M.J., Nuttle, H.L.W., 1986. The effect of commonality on safety
stock in a simple inventory model. Manag. Sci. 32 (8), 982–988.
Benedettini, O., Neely, A. 2010. Why do servitized ﬁrms fail. In: Proceedings of the
17th EurOMA Conference, 6th–9th June, Porto, Portugal.
Clark, K., Wheelwright, S., 1993. Managing Product and Process Development. The
Free Press, New York.
Da Silveira, G., Borenstein, D., Fogliatto, F.S., 2001. Mass customization: literature
review and research directions. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 72 (1), 1–13.
Ellsberg, D., 1961. Risk, ambiguity and the savage axioms. Q. J. Econ. 75 (4),
653–669.
Fetzinger, E., Lee, H.L., 1997. Mass customization at Hewlett-Packard: the power of
postponement. Harv. Bus. Rev., 116–121.
Fisher, M.L., 1997. What is the right supply chain for your product? Harv. Bus. Rev.
75, 105–117.
Fogliatto, F.S., da Silveira, G.J., Borenstein, D., 2012. The mass customization decade:
an updated review of the literature. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 138 (1), 14–25.
Forza, C., Salvador, F., Trentin, A., 2008. Form postponement effects on operational
performance: a typological theory. Int. J. Oper. Prod. Manag. 28 (11),
1067–1094.
Gawer, A., 2009. Platforms, Markets and Innovation. Edward Elgar Publishing,
Cheltenham.
Gosling, J., Naim, M.M., 2009. Engineer-to-order supply chain management:
a literature review and research agenda. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 122 (2), 741–754.
Guide, V.D.R., Van Wassenhove, L.N., 2009. The evolution of closed-loop supply
chain research. Oper. Res. 57 (1), 10–18.
Hazen, B.T., Boone, C.h.A., Ezell, J.D., Jones-Farmer, L.A., 2014. Data quality for data
science, predictive Analytics, and big data in supply chain management: an
introduction to the problem and Suggestions for research and Applications.
International Journal of Production Economics (Forthcoming, Available at:).
Jiao, J.R., Simpson, T.W., Siddique, Z., 2007. Product family design and platform-
based product development: a state-of-the-art review. J. Intell. Manuf. 18 (1),
5–29.
Knight, F., 1921. Risk, Uncertainty and Proﬁt. In: Hart, Schaffner, Marx (Eds.),
Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin Company, The Riverside Press, Cambridge.
Krishnan, V., Gupta, S., 2001. Appropriateness and impact of platform-based
product development. Manag. Sci. 47 (1), 52–68.
Lampel, J., Mintzberg, H., 1996. Customizing customization. Sloan Manag. Rev. 38
(1), 21–30.
Lee, H.L., Billington, C., 1992. Supply chain management: pitfalls and opportunities.
Sloan Manag. Rev. 33 (Spring), 65–73.
Lusch, R.F., Vargo, S.L., Tanniru, M., 2010. Service, value networks and learning. J.
Acad. Mark. Sci. 38 (1), 19–31.
Mason, R., Lalwani, C., 2008. Mass customised distribution. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 114 (1),
71–83.
MacCarthy, B., Brabazon, P.G., Bramham, J., 2003. Fundamental modes of operation
for mass customization. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 85 (3), 289–304.
McCarthy, I.P., 2004. Special issue editorial: The what, why and how of mass
customization. Prod. Plan. Control: Manag. Oper. 15 (4), 347–351.
Ng, I., Guo, L., Ding, Y. 2012. Continuing use of information technology as value co-
creation: the role of contextual variety and means drivenness. WMG Service
Systems Research Group Working Paper Series, paper number 07/12, ISSN
2049-4297. Available at: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/42448/.
Ng, I.C.L., Ding, X., Yip, N.K.T., 2013. Outcome-based contracts as new business
model: the role of partnership and value-driven relational assets. Industrial
Marketing Management Special Issue on Business Models – Exploring Value
Drivers and The Role of Marketing, 42; , pp. 730–743.
Perera, C., Zaslavsky, A., Liu, C.H., Compton, M., Christen, P., Georgakopoulos, D.,
2014. Sensor search techniques for sensing as a service architecture for the
internet of things. IEEE Sensors J. (forthcoming).
Pasche, M., Persson, M., Löfsten, H., 2011. Effects of platforms on new product
development projects. Int. J. Oper. Prod. Manag. 31 (11), 1144–1163.
Prahalad, C.K., Ramaswamy, V., 2004. Co-creation experiences: the next practice in
value creation. J. Interact. Mark. 18 (3), 5–14.
Rowley, J., 2005. The four Cs of customer loyalty. Marketing intelligence & planning
23 (6), 574–581.
Salvador, F., Forza, C., 2004. Conﬁguring products to address the customization-
responsiveness squeeze: a survey of management issues and opportunities. Int.
J. Prod. Econ. 91 (3), 273–291.
Salvador, F., Forza, C., 2007. Principles for efﬁcient and effective sales conﬁguration
design. Int. J. Mass Cust. 2, 114–127.
Schilling, M.A., 2009. Protecting or diffusing a technology platform: Tradeoffs in
appropriability, network externalities, and architectural control. In: Gawer, A.
(Ed.), Platforms, Markets and Innovation. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham,
pp. 192–218.
Shapiro, R.D., 1984. Get leverage from logistics. Harv. Bus. Rev. 62, 119–126.
Stalk, G., 1988. Time – the next source of competitive advantage. Harv. Bus. Rev. 66,
41–51.
Sun, X.Y., Ji, P., Sun, L.Y., Wang, Y.L., 2008. Positioning multiple decoupling points in
a supply network. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 113 (2), 943–956.
Trentin, A., Perin, E., Forza, C., 2011. Overcoming the customization-responsiveness
squeeze by using product conﬁgurators: beyond anecdotal evidence. Comput.
Ind. 62 (3), 260–268.
Vargo, S.L., Lusch, R.F., 2004. Evolving to a new dominant logic for marketing.
J. Mark. 68, 1–17.
Vargo, S.L., Lusch, R.F., 2008. Service-dominant logic: continuing the evolution.
J. Acad. Mark. Sci. 36 (1), 1–10.
Wan, X., Evers, P.T., Dresner, M.E., 2012. Too much of a good thing: the impact of
product variety on operations and sales performance. J. Oper. Manag. 30 (4),
316–324.
Wikner, J., Rudberg, M. 2001. On the customer order decoupling point. Working
Paper no. WP-284, Department of Production Economics, Linkoping Institute of
Technology, Sweden.
Xia, N., Rajagopalan, S., 2009. Standard vs. custom products: variety, lead time, and
price competition. Mark. Sci. 28 (5), 887–900.
Yang, B., Burns, N.D., 2003. Implications of postponement for the supply chain. Int. J.
Prod. Res. 41 (9), 2075–2090.
Yang, B., Burns, N.D., Backhouse, C.J., 2004. Postponement: a review and an
integrated framework. Int. J. Oper. Prod. Manag. 24 (5), 468–487.
Yeh, K.H., Chu, C.H., 1991. Adaptive strategies for coping with product variety
decisions. Int. J. Oper. Prod. Manag. 11 (8), 35–47.
Yoo, Y., Henfridsson, O., Lyytinen, K., 2010. The new organizing logic of digital
innovation: an agenda for information systems research. Inf. Syst. Res. 21 (4),
724–735.
Zahay, D., Mason, C.H., Schibrowsky, J.A., 2009. The present and future of IMC and
database marketing. Int. J. Integr. Mark. Commun. 1 (2), 13–30.
17 For more information, see http://hubofallthings.org.
I. Ng et al. / Int. J. Production Economics 159 (2015) 76–87 87
